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In the preceding essay, W. Lee Hoskins, president of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, reiterates the case for 
zero inflation and counters some of my criticisms of that 
potential policy goal (made in Aiyagari 1990). He speaks, I 
think, for many who find zero inflation a laudable goal. In 
this essay, I try to respond to that point of view and to clarify 
where and why my point of view differs. I conclude with a 
few comments on some common concerns about existing 
theoretical and empirical models. 
The Central Issues 
The differences on zero inflation revolve around the an-
swers to these questions: 
• Can the central bank make a credible commitment to 
pursue a policy aimed at maintaining a stable price 
level? 
• Should monetary policy be used to reduce the tax on 
capital income? 
• Would reducing uncertainty about inflation produce 
significant social benefits? 
Zero inflation proponents answer all of these questions yes, 
while critics like me answer no. Why such a disagreement? 
In general, I think it is fair to say that answering these 
questions is not just a matter of applying current economic 
knowledge. The theoretical models we have are incomplete, 
unsatisfactory in several ways, and possibly incorrect guides 
to policymaking. The empirical evidence is often inconclu-
sive and open to different interpretations. Therefore, an-
swering these questions necessarily involves a fair amount 
of judgment. One person's judgment leads to one set of 
answers; another person's, to another. 
Let's examine these central issues in more detail. 
Central Bank Credibility 
Moving from the current rate of inflation to zero inflation 
may have some social costs, for it would temporarily in-
crease unemployment. How great this transition cost would 
be depends crucially on the credibility of the central bank's 
commitment to a zero inflation goal. I concur with Hoskins 
that the variety of opinions among economists on the size of 
this transition cost arises from disagreement about how 
credible the public regards the policy to be. 
Zero inflation proponents must believe that the public 
can be convinced that the central bank will stick to an 
announced zero inflation goal. I am rather skeptical about 
that. 
Hoskins, for example, asserts that "a central bank can, 
over time, control the price level of goods and services 
denominated in its own currency." This conclusion is war-
ranted only if the central bank can make a credible commit-
ment to pursuing a particular monetary policy. Making such 
a credible commitment depends on coordination between 
the central bank and the fiscal authorities over the long run. 
The central bank can control long-run inflation if the fiscal 
authorities accommodate by adjusting taxes to maintain 
21 balance in the federal budget over the long run. If the fiscal 
authorities do not accommodate in this way, then sooner or 
later the central bank will be forced to monetize the accumu-
lating mountain of public debt. Then the central bank's 
commitment will not be credible, and—despite intermittent, 
short periods when it seemed able to control inflation—it 
will not be able to control inflation in the long run. 
Therefore, the issue of central bank credibility in pursu-
ing an inflation target is closely connected to whether fiscal 
policy will be accommodative. Zero inflation proponents 
believe that it will be and, hence, that the central bank can 
make credible commitments to pursue a stable price level 
target. The recent repeated failures by the federal govern-
ment to contain the deficit make me (and, I think, the general 
public) skeptical that fiscal policy will accommodate mon-
etary policy.
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This is probably not an area in which further theorizing 
of a purely economic sort is likely to help narrow our 
differences. To do that, we need theories about the political 
processes governing spending, taxation, and monetary policy. 
The Capital Income Tax 
Reducing the inflation rate to zero would reduce the effec-
tive capital income tax rate because it would raise the real 
value of the depreciation deduction for businesses. The real 
value of that deduction would increase because the federal 
tax code bases it on the original dollar cost of acquiring 
capital goods rather than on their current market value. 
Some studies indicate that shifting the burden of taxation 
away from capital improves welfare. 
I suggested (in Aiyagari 1990) that a simpler way to do 
that would be to index the tax code (so that changes in the 
average inflation rate do not shift the burden of taxation 
across categories of income or expenditure) and then to 
lower the tax rate on capital income. That is, if certain shifts 
in the tax burden are desirable, then these should be made 
directly by Congress, the authority constitutionally respon-
sible for tax policy, rather than indirectly by the monetary 
authority. 
Zero inflation proponents emphasize that, from a practi-
cal point of view, indexing the tax system is a difficult job. 
Even if indexing is the more desirable policy option, Hoskins 
says, why not reduce inflation now instead of waiting for a 
reform of the tax system? 
My response has four parts. 
First, if reforming the tax system is the better way to 
proceed, then adjusting monetary policy may well lessen the 
incentive to do so. 
Second, while indexing certainly is difficult, it clearly is 
not impossible: Considerable progress has already been 
made, and recently. The individual income tax brackets, for 
example, are now indexed to some extent. We ought to be 
urging more progress on this front rather than considering 
measures that reduce the incentive for more progress. 
Third, even if monetary policy managed to reach zero 
inflation and thereby lower the effective tax on capital 
income (and incur the transition cost), what guarantee is 
there that Congress would not respond someday by raising 
the statutory tax rates on capital income? If we, as econo-
mists, favor reforming the tax system and reducing the 
capital income tax, then we should focus our efforts on 
persuading Congress of the benefits of doing so. This way, 
the benefits are likely to last longer. 
Fourth, it may not be all that difficult to link inflation and 
the depreciation deduction for businesses, a major channel 
of inflation's influence on the capital income tax. Basically, 
what needs to be done is to use some average inflation rate 
figure to annually adjust the market value of capital goods (if 
reliable market data on current values are not available). 
This wouldn't likely be a perfect system, but it should be a 
significant improvement over the current system of valuing 
capital goods at original cost for depreciation purposes. 
Inflation Uncertainty 
I questioned (in Aiyagari 1990) whether there was any 
significant benefit associated with reduced uncertainty 
about inflation. My reading of the theoretical and empiri-
cal studies suggests at best very weak support for the notion 
that reduced uncertainty itself yields much of a benefit. My 
reading suggests similarly weak support for the notion that 
deliberately reducing the average rate of inflation by reduc-
ing the average growth rate of money will reduce uncer-
tainty about inflation. 
The average inflation rate depends on the average growth 
in real output and money. The variability of inflation de-
pends on the shocks hitting the economy and the way 
monetary and fiscal policies respond to them. So, there need 
not be any connection between inflation's average rate and 
its variability. Furthermore, the variability of inflation is not 
generally sufficient to assess the impact on welfare. The 
appropriate way for monetary and fiscal policies to respond 
to economic shocks need not always produce both lower 
inflation variability and higher welfare. 
Hoskins suggests that currently available theoretical 
models do not take adequate account of long-run uncer-
tainty, which he feels is very important. He cites studies that 
1 Hoskins suggests (in this issue) that requiring the central bank to pursue a low 
and stable inflation rate would provide credibility and minimize the transition cost. 
A considerable literature suggests that rules are more desirable than discretionary 
policymaking. I would agree with both of these propositions. Still, there remains 
the question of whether zero inflation is where we ought to be. 
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show a positive relation between the average inflation rate 
and long-run uncertainty and between the variability of 
inflation and economic growth. 
Such correlations are unlikely to ever resolve these issues 
any more than correlations between money and output will 
resolve the issue of whether business cycles are driven 
primarily by monetary shocks or by real shocks, with money 
responding passively. What we need to find is not just 
correlations, but a causal mechanism that explains these 
relationships and suggests appropriate policies.
2 
A Reminder 
The cost of moving to zero inflation may be significant 
under the current institutional arrangement, but I agree with 
Hoskins that it may be insignificant under other arrange-
ments which involve imposing rules on the central bank. I 
would like to remind readers, however, that in my earlier 
essay my negative judgment about the zero inflation policy 
rested on more than the policy's transition costs; it was also 
based on a close examination of the policy' s overall welfare 
benefits. As I argued, when other policy options are taken 
into account, the benefits of zero inflation shrink close to 
zero—and may even turn negative. 
Besides tax code changes, those other policies include 
deregulating interest rates on all demand deposits and pay-
ing interest on bank reserves. If we made those changes, the 
welfare benefit from zero inflation would only come from 
the use of currency. This benefit couldn't be large; currency 
is a very small part of total liquid assets. And most U.S. cur-
rency—over 80 percent, according to some studies (Avery 
et al. 1987)—is held by people living in other countries and 
by people active in the underground economy. Those facts 
make the argument for eliminating inflation much less 
persuasive. 
Concluding Comments 
My criticisms of the zero inflation policy and suggestions of 
alternative policy options are based on my judgment of the 
best available theoretical models. Zero inflation proponents 
are dissatisfied with some of these models and suspicious of 
the answers they give. Hoskins, for instance, is quite skep-
tical of the estimates of the transaction cost of inflation 
because these estimates are based on market-clearing, flex-
ible-price, rational expectations models whereas models 
used to estimate the transition cost contain some ad hoc 
friction like nominally sticky price contracts.
3 
I agree in principle that if models with frictions are going 
to be used to study the cost of shifting to zero inflation, then 
such models should also be used to study the cost of 
maintaining any particular inflation rate. However, the use 
of different types of models for these different purposes may 
simply reflect a judgment that while frictions are quantita-
tively important for measuring the transition cost, they are 
not so important for measuring the cost of a given average 
rate of inflation. Hoskins may be right to question that 
judgment. This is one area in which further research would 
be helpful.
4 
As noted earlier, Hoskins is also very skeptical of the 
relevance of models which suggest, in my judgment, an 
insignificantly low welfare benefit from reduced inflation 
uncertainty. This skepticism appears to be primarily due to 
the feeling that existing models of money and the effects of 
monetary and fiscal policies do not capture some important 
elements of how actual economies work. 
I certainly agree that the present state of theoretical and 
empirical knowledge in this area is incomplete and thus 
possibly an incorrect guide to policy. Policymakers have a 
difficult problem that only more research can solve. Hoskins 
deserves credit for actively promoting such research. 
In the United States during the 1970s, inflation's average rate and its 
variability were higher than during the 1960s. In Aiyagari 1990,1 cited a study by 
John Taylor (1981) which argues that this positive relation is due merely to 
monetary policy responses to supply shocks that had lifted the inflation rate. This 
is an example of a causal mechanism that explains the observed correlation and 
implies that deliberately reducing the average inflation rate is not likely to reduce 
the variability of inflation. 
3Hoskins argues that the sorts of frictions that make the transition to zero 
inflation costly (that is, nominal contracts) are also likely to imply significantly 
larger costs of maintaining a particular inflation rate. He suggests that the frictions 
which generate nominal contracts "must involve resource costs that are positively 
related to the average rate of inflation." But why should it be more costly to index 
contracts to a steady inflation rate of 10 percent than to one of 5 percent? 
^n Aiyagari 1990,1 referred to a paper by Ayse Imrohoroglu (1989) which 
attempts to show that taking account of the friction of imperfect insurance markets 
leads to a larger estimate of the cost of a given average rate of inflation than 
estimates from other studies which did not take this friction into account. In her 
model, however, money is the only asset available for self-insurance, so I think her 
estimates are too large. (See Aiyagari 1990, p. 3, n. 3.) 
23 References 
Aiyagari, S. Rao. 1990. Deflating the case for zero inflation. Federal Reserve Bank 
of Minneapolis Quarterly Review 14 (Summer): 2-11. 
Avery, Robert B.; Elliehausen, Gregory E.; Kennickell, Arthur B.; and Spindt, 
Paul A. 1987. Changes in the use of transaction accounts and cash from 1984 
to 1986. Federal Reserve Bulletin 73 (March): 179-96. 
Imrohoroglu, Ayse. 1989. The welfare cost of inflation under imperfect insurance. 
Working Paper. Department of Finance and Business Economics, University 
of Southern California. 
Taylor, John B. 1981. On the relation between the variability of inflation and the 
average inflation rate. In The costs and consequences of inflation, ed. Karl 
Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on 
Public Policy 15 (Autumn): 57-85. Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
24 